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Abstract²The UK is subject to changing weather patterns due to 
the global process of climate change. The full extent of these 
changes is not currently known; however, it is possible that the UK 
will be subject to more extreme or more frequent severe weather 
events (or both). As 50% of the faults on the transmission network 
in Britain are weather related it is likely that any change in 
weather patterns for the worse would increase the number of 
faults the network experiences. This paper describes a review of 
fault records in one region of the UK in order to understand the 
potential impact on system operation of clusters of weather related 
network faults. Based on the patterns of identified clusters, it 
suggests some potential impacts of climate change.  
 
Index Terms² Adverse or Extreme Weather, Fault Outages, 
GB Transmission Network  
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the UK, around 50% of transmission faults are caused in 
some manner by the weather. Faults, abnormal currents 
which cause a piece of equipment or circuit to be automatically 
or manually switched out of service, can be caused by a range 
of weather events[1]. High wind speeds can damage overhead 
lines by causing conductor galloping and, as a consequence, 
short circuits, mechanical failure of insulator fittings or cross 
arms, trees or debris to fall onto the lines or, in extreme cases, 
poles or towers to fail. Ice and snow can also impact overhead 
lines, with additional weight from ice or snow build-up causing 
aerofoil effects in high winds leading to short circuits, lines and 
towers to fall, or on occasion, trees to fall onto them. Lightning 
strikes can produce ionised gases, which if near overhead line 
conductors can provide a current path causing a flashover, 
which activates automatic protection systems. If lightning 
strikes the conductors themselves this can cause a voltage 
surge, which can affect equipment connected to the lines, such 
as transformers.  
As the effects of climate change begin to be felt, it is likely 
that the weather in the UK will change significantly, either with 
more frequent occurrences of severe weather, or with weather 
events with greater extremes. There have been many studies  
that have been performed on the potential impact of climate 
change on various aspects of the UK from food security, to 
flooding. The UK Meteorological Office [2] suggests that, over 
the coming century,  Britain will see temperature rises of around 
3 °C based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change¶V 6SHFLDO 5HSRrt on Emissions Scenarios scenario 
A1B[3], which is broadly central among IPCC emissions 
scenarios.  If this is the case, there could be a significant impact 
on operation of the power system. Research has been conducted 
into how these changes might affect electricity networks 
throughout the world, particularly North America[1][4] and the 
Nordic countries [5]. Potential effects include increased 
demand for cooling services in summer, reduced line and 
transformer ratings, impacts on the efficiency of thermal 
generating plant and changed patterns of power available from 
weather-dependent renewables as well the possibility of 
increased numbers of weather-related faults[6]. Under extreme 
high temperature conditions, ecological considerations might 
cause thermal power plant dependent on rivers or lakes for 
cooling to shut down due to excessive water temperatures[7]. 
7KHLPSDFWRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHRQWKH8.¶VGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUN
has also been explored [8]. However, the impact on the Great 
Britain (GB) transmission network has not been fully examined, 
with earlier research focused on the specific impact of wind 
related faults [9]. 
Discrete periods of adverse, severe or extreme weather 
caused by a particular weather system can be referred to as a 
single weather event. From a power system operation 
perspective, the severity of a particular weather event concerns 
the number of faults that occur in its course and the duration of 
the outages caused by the faults.  
 This paper considers past weather related faults, with a view 
to assessing the broad potential impact of a changing climate on 
the GB transmission grid. To achieve this transmission fault 
data for the ScottishPower Energy Networks (SPEN) 
transmission license area (located in the south of Scotland ± see  
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[10]) from 1985 ± 2011 was analysed in an attempt to identify 
the network faults associated with different weather events and 
to understand the severity of each weather event. This was done 
firstly through temporal clustering of network faults and then 
by reviewing the number of faults in each cluster, the cOXVWHU¶V
duration and its spatial extent. From this, the possible effect of 
climate change causing more such events or more severe events 
can be assessed.  
The fault data from SPEN comprised: information about the 
date and time of the fault; the date and time of fault restoration; 
the circuits affected by the fault; whether the fault was 
permanent or transient; the type of equipment which faulted; 
the number of affected customers if there was a disconnection 
of demand; the voltage level the fault occurred at; and a brief 
description of the cause of the fault. In total the record detailed 
3,066 faults. From the fault descriptions it was possible to 
separate the faults into weather related (1532) and non-weather 
related (1534). The weather related faults were then divided 
further into those caused by: ice, snow, sleet and blizzard (436); 
lightning (293); wind, gales, and windborne objects (619); and 
salt, corrosion, and condensation (129). The remaining faults, 
categorised as rain and flooding, pollution, mist and freezing 
fog, other weather types and fire not due to faults, (total 55), 
were not included in this study due to their small number. 
The next section discusses the initial temporal clustering and 
the numbers of fault in each cluster. The durations of clusters 
and their spatial extent are discussed in sections III and IV. The 
main findings are discussed in section V before the presentation 
of some conclusions and recommendations for further work in 
section VI. 
II. TEMPORAL CLUSTERING 
In order to identify individual weather events, such as storms, 
which caused one or more weather-related faults, a cluster 
analysis was performed.  
The clusters were identified in the data based on the date and 
time that the faults occurred. The length of time that a storm can 
last can vary from a few hours to days [1][5]. Thus, for 
consistency, for this analysis a weather event was considered 
finished if over 2 hours (taken as a minimum for the length of a 
storm) passed without another fault event in at least one of the 
same circuits [11]. From this: 70 ice, snow, sleet and blizzard, 
161 lightning, 123 wind, gale, and windborne objects, and 61 
condensation, corrosion, and salt clusters were found. 
A. Faults due to ice, snow, sleet and blizzards 
The size of the each of the clusters found in the ice, snow, sleet 
and blizzard data can be seen in Fig. 1. The largest cluster, 
cluster #47, consists of 135 faults. This was caused by a large 
blizzard in 2001 affecting the circuits around the nuclear power 
station, Torness, and the coal-fired power station, Cockenzie, in 
the south-east of Scotland. Most other ice, snow, sleet or 
blizzard related events were smaller, with a large number 
containing only one fault. The average duration of ice, snow, 
sleet or blizzard related fault outages was 2 hours 20 minutes 
with the shortest lasting less than 1 minute and the longest 22 
hours 51 minutes. 
 
A frequency distribution of the clusters can be seen in Fig. 2. 
From this it can be clearly seen that around half of the clusters 
contain only one fault, with one quarter consisting of only 2. On 
average clusters contained around 6 faults. 
 
Statistical analysis [8] suggests that snow related faults are 
correlated with both daily maximum snowfall and daily 
maximum wind gusts. Although daily maximum wind gusts 
could potentially increase (although they may decrease or 
remain similar) [9], the daily maximum snowfall is expected to 
fall, with a decrease in days in which snow occurs [8]. This 
suggests that the severity and number of these types of weather 
events is likely to decrease, and therefore the total number of 
faults on the GB system due to ice, snow, sleet and blizzard is 
likely to decrease too. However, rare, severe events can still 
occur and, if there are more frequent high speed wind gusts, will 
see more faults during snow, ice or sleet related events and, 
potentially, mechanical damage (not just transient faults) with 
long circuit restoration times. 
B. Faults due to lightning 
 
Fig. 3 shows the clusters found for the data on faults due to 
lightning. Unlike in the ice, snow, sleet and blizzard data, there 
do not appear to be large lightning events which cause large 
Fig. 1. Clusters in ice, snow, sleet and blizzard data.  
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Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of size of ice, snow, sleet, and blizzard clusters 
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Fig. 3. Clusters in lightning data 
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numbers of faults. There are a few smaller events which cause 
10 or more events, and several which cause 5 or more. A 
frequency distribution for these faults can be seen in Fig. 4. The 
average duration of individual lightning fault outages was 43 
minutes. Only 8% of faults had an outage time greater than 120 
minutes with longest restoration time among these being 22 
days, due to damage to a transformer, which likely needed to be 
replaced. 
 
Faults due to lightning could be affected by projected 
changes in UK weather. Projections [8][12][13] suggest that 
lightning events are likely to occur more frequently in the UK, 
due to an increase in days with stronger convection, this would 
lead to an increase in the number of faults due to lightning. 
However, as noted above, the circuit outage duration associated 
with a lightning related fault is typically very short.  
C. Faults due to wind, gales, and windborne objects 
In Fig. 5, the cluster sizes for wind, gale, and windborne objects, 
it can be seen that there are four large clusters (with two 
particularly large).  
 
One of the largest events (cluster #45) was caused by a storm 
which affected the area around the Hunterston nuclear station 
in the west of Scotland in 1998. The other large event (cluster 
#68) was caused by a storm affecting first the Windyhill grid 
supply point, and Whitelee wind farm in the west of Scotland, 
then later the Cockenzie coal-fired power station, and the 
Torness nuclear power station ORFDWHGRQ6FRWODQG¶VHDVWFRDVW. 
That is, it could be seen to traverse the whole of the south of 
Scotland from west to east over the course of 7 hours with wind 
speed remaining high enough to cause faults throughout that 
time. 
Fig. 6 shows a frequency distribution of the wind, gale, and 
windborne objects clusters. It has a similar shape to the previous 
weather types, showing a majority of events causing a single 
fault, several causing two, and less causing greater than two. 
 
Wind events account for the almost half of the weather 
related events recorded in the fault data, and include 
significantly sized clusters. There is a strong correlation 
between both wind speed and wind gusts and fault 
occurrences[9]. In particular faults are most likely when wind 
gusts of over 15m/s are observed. If climate change causes an 
increase in the probability of wind gusts over 15m/s, then there 
is likely to be a sizable increase in the number of faults. The 
exact effect that climate change is likely to have on wind speeds 
in the UK has not yet been fully determined [2][8]. As with ice, 
snow, sleet or blizzard related faults, particularly high wind 
speeds can cause mechanical damage in which case the circuit 
restoration time can be expected to be very long. 
D. Faults due to salt, corrosion, and condensation 
Weather related salt, corrosion, and condensation events are 
generally caused by salt build-up on insulators, which causes 
flashover during mist or rain. As can be seen from Fig. 7, there 
is one large cluster, #23 containing 47 faults. This is likely to 
have been caused by a large salt build up on the circuits around 
the Hunterston nuclear power station, located on the west coast 
of Scotland, during the same 1998 storm as the wind, gale, and 
windborne objects cluster #47. During rain the following day, a 
large number of salt-related flashover events were seen and 
formed cluster #23.   
 
From Fig. 8, the frequency distribution, it can be seen that the 
majority of clusters contain only one fault, with only 10 of the 
61 clusters consisting of greater than this. 
Fig. 4. Frequency distribution of size of lightning clusters 
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Fig. 5. Clusters in wind, gale, and windborne objects data 
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Fig. 7. Clusters in corrosion, condensation, and salt data.  
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Precipitation is likely to increase in the UK from climate 
change in the coming years. As the majority of weather-related 
salt faults are caused in part by the wind, this is another area 
where an increase in wind speed has the potential to increase 
faults. However as discussed above, the likely impact of climate 
change on wind speeds is inconclusive. 
III. DURATION OF CLUSTERS 
The duration of the clusters was also investigated. This was 
calculated from the time of the start of the first fault outage in 
the cluster until the start of the last fault outage in the cluster, 
and was taken as an indication of the period of time a weather 
event was causing fault outages. For clusters with a single fault 
the duration was taken from the fault occurring to the circuit 
restoration. Around 44% of the weather-related faults detailed 
in the data were permanent faults, with the rest being transient.  
Of the clusters which contained more than 1 fault: ice, snow, 
sleet and blizzard clusters had an average of 11.4 faults per hour 
(standard deviation 25.2); lightning clusters had an average of 
8.4 faults per hour (standard deviation 16.2); wind, gale, and 
windborne object clusters have an average of 18.6 faults per 
hour (standard deviation 72); and corrosion, condensation and 
salt clusters have an average of 6 faults per hour (standard 
deviation 11.4).  
A. Faults due to ice, snow, sleet and blizzards 
Fig. 9 shows the duration of the ice, snow, sleet and blizzard 
clusters. As can be seen, some clusters contain only transient 
faults, which are cleared within seconds, other events clearly 
last for many hours. The longest events do not necessarily cause 
the most faults, however, suggesting that shorter, more intense 
weather events might be a more significant problem. 
 
A frequency distribution of the ice, snow, sleet and blizzard 
fault clusters is shown in Fig. 10. The most common duration 
for an event of this type is up to four hours, followed by those 
cleared instantly, with a small number occurring from 4-24 
hours. 
 
The total duration of ice, snow, sleet and blizzard clusters is 164 
hours, which represents 0.07% of the time covered by the data. 
B. Faults due to lightning 
Lightning fault cluster durations, shown in Fig. 11, in general 
are shorter than ice, sleet snow and blizzard clusters.  
 
No events last longer than 16 hours, and most are transient, or 
last for only 1 or 2 hours. This is likely due to the behaviour of 
lightning storms. In general, lighting cluster duration increasing 
with the number of associated faults, but some outlier clusters 
comprising a large number of faults in a short time are also 
observed. 
 
The frequency distribution of lightning cluster fault durations 
(Fig. 12) shows that, as with ice, sleet, snow and blizzard 
clusters, the majority last up to four hours again followed by 
those of minimal duration. This is more pronounced, however, 
with only 3 fault clusters lasting greater than 4 hours, and none 
lasting longer than 15.   
Fig. 8. Frequency distribution of size of corrosion, condensation, and salt 
clusters 
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Fig. 11. Duration of lightning clusters 
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Fig. 12. Frequency distribution of lightning cluster durations 
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The lightning fault clusters had a total duration of 114 hours, 
approximately 0.05% of the total time covered by the data. 
C. Faults due to wind, gales, and windborne objects 
Fig. 13 shows the wind, gale, and windborne objects cluster 
durations. The clusters of this type tend to last longer than the 
lightning clusters, although not as long as the ice, snow, sleet 
and blizzard clusters. 
 
From the frequency distribution, Fig. 14, it can be seen that, 
as with the previous fault types, the majority of clusters last up 
to 4 hours, followed by those of minimal duration. A few events 
last from 4 up to nearly 20 hours.  
 
The total duration of the wind, gale, and windborne objects 
clusters was 195 hours, approximately 0.08% of the total time 
of the years covered by the data. 
D. Faults due to salt, corrosion, and condensation 
 
The vast majority of salt, corrosion, and condensation cluster 
contain only a single fault, many of which are transient, 
therefore as can be seen from Fig. 15, the majority of clusters 
have no duration.  
Unlike the other fault types, as can be seen in Fig. 16, very 
few clusters contain faults that are not transient, with only 6 
clusters lasting up to 4 hours, and only 2 lasting beyond that. 
 
The salt, corrosion, and condensation clusters had a total 
duration of 28 hours, approximately 0.01% of the total time of 
the years covered by the data. 
IV. SPATIAL EXTENT OF CLUSTERS 
The spatial extent of each cluster, i.e., the likely area affected 
by the weather event which caused the faults in the cluster, was 
assessed. The affected area was estimated by first finding the 
centroid of the cluster by averaging the latitude and longitude 
of the mid-point of the affected substations [14]. The area was 
then defined as a circle with a radius connecting the centroid 
with whichever affected substation in the cluster was furthest 
from the centroid. For example, lightning cluster #1, affected 
circuits connected to the substations of Bonnybridge (lat. 
55.0079 long. -3.86042), Kincardine (lat. 56.0753 long. -
3.72997) and Stirling (lat. 56.1178 long. -3.91906), giving a 
centroid of lat. 56.067 long. -3.83648. The furthest affected 
substation from this is Bonnybridge, giving a radius of 16.92 
km, and therefore an estimated geographical area for lightning 
cluster #1 of 900km2 with a diameter of 34 km. This gave an 
approximate area for comparison purposes, although did have 
the potential to overstate the true geographic extent of the 
weather event which caused the faults within the cluster. 
A. Faults due to ice, snow, sleet and blizzards 
 
Fig. 17 shows the logarithmic plot of the diameter of the spatial 
extent, as defined above, of each of the ice, snow, sleet and 
blizzard clusters. Several of these clusters covered a large 
geographic area, with three clusters affecting a calculated area 
of over 100,000 km2 which, if circular, would have a diameter 
of 360 km 
Fig. 13. Duration of wind, gale, and windborne objects clusters 
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durations 
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Fig. 15. Duration of corrosion, condensation, and salt clusters 
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B. Faults due to lightning 
From Fig. 18 (the spatial extent of the lightning clusters) it can 
be seen that the largest calculated area of the lightning clusters 
was greater than that of the ice, snow, sleet, and blizzard 
clusters. As the lightning clusters on average contained fewer 
faults, this suggests that lightning events are more spread out 
than ice, snow, sleet and blizzard events.   
 
C. Faults due to wind, gales, and windborne objects 
The wind, gale, and windborne objects clusters which affected 
the largest areas (shown in Fig. 19) were larger again than either 
ice, snow, sleet, and blizzard clusters, or the lightning clusters. 
Comparing these values with the number of faults in the wind, 
gale, and windborne object clusters suggests that when wind 
events occur they effect a large geographic area, and effect a 
greater number of circuits in the area in which the weather event 
is occurs than lightning storms or blizzards. 
 
D. Faults due to salt, corrosion, and condensation 
 
The majority of the salt, corrosion, and condensation clusters 
affected only one circuit, therefore the majority of the clusters 
do not have a calculated spatial extent, as can be seen in Fig. 
20. The clusters of spatial extent with a diameter greater than 
100 km (including cluster #23), affected coast areas, likely due 
to a combination of wind and rain, as discussed in section III.  
A summary of the spatial extent of the clusters can be seen in 
Fig. 21, which shows a comparison of the cumulative frequency 
distributions of the cluster diameters by fault type. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Fault durations and rate of occurrence 
Analysis was presented in section III of the spread of fault 
durations, i.e. the time taken for each faulted circuit to be 
returned to service, in each weather category and the rate of 
occurrence of both transient (where the circuit is returned to 
service is less than a minute) and sustained faults in each 
cluster.  
Given that transmission system operators typically operate to 
defined VHFXULW\VWDQGDUGVHJ³1-´WKHUHVKRXOGQRUPDOO\EH
no significant adverse impact of a single fault event. (The 
system operator in GB is obliged to comply with the Security 
and Quality of Supply Standard[15]). However, the importance 
of weather events in which a number of faults might occur 
within a relatively short space of time is that, for sustained faults 
on circuits that have not yet been restored to service, it might 
not have been possible to re-secure the system before a second 
or third fault occurs. That is, the system is exposed to N-2 or N-
3 situations against which it is not normally configured to be 
automatically secure. Under these situations, the system is 
much more vulnerable to thermal overloads, voltage excursions 
or instability and, in a worst case, is exposed to the possibility 
of cascading outages. Thus, especially for weather types that 
involve quite rapid occurrence of sustained faults, the risk of 
interruptions to demand can be high. Furthermore, the 
occurrence of multiple faults that require repair or other on-site 
response within a short space of time places a large burden on 
the field staff. In severe weather, this can be compounded by 
the same weather making access to site very difficult. 
In the analysis conducted in this study, it has been found that 
for wind, gale, and windborne object events, ice, snow, sleet 
and blizzard events, and lightning events are more likely to 
include multiple circuits than not, with over 50% of clusters 
found to affect more than 2 circuits. 15% of all wind type, and 
18% of all blizzard- and lightning-type clusters affect more than 
5 circuits. Over 5% of both wind-type and blizzard-type affect 
more than 10 circuits. In contrast only 40% of salt, corrosion 
Fig. 18. Spatial extent of lightning clusters 
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Fig. 19. Spatial extent of wind, gale, and windborne objects clusters 
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Fig. 20. Spatial extent of corrosion, condensation, and salt clusters 
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Fig. 21. Cumulative frequency distributions of cluster diameters by fault type  
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and condensation events affected more than 2 circuits, with less 
than 5% affecting more than 5. Given this, as the average ice, 
snow, sleet and blizzard fault has a return-to-service time of 
approximately 2 hours (compared to approximately 30 minutes 
for wind, gale or windborne object and lightning faults), from 
this analysis it is these type of faults which provide the greatest 
likelihood of multiple circuits being subject to faults 
simultaneously. Wind type faults also appear to provide a risk 
of simultaneous faults, as wind type clusters were found to have 
the highest number of faults per hour (18.6 per hour as 
discussed in section III compared with a year-round average 
rate of occurrence for the SPEN transmission area due to any 
type of fault of 0.006 per hour). 
Comparing fault rates (including single-fault clusters) during 
adverse and non-adverse weather, highlights the increased 
likelihood of concurrent faults during storm conditions. 
TABLE 1. OCCURRENCE OF FAULTS 
Weather 
Total time 
(hours) 
Number 
of faults 
Occurrence 
of faults 
(faults/hour) 
Wind, etc. 195 619 3.17 
Snow, etc. 164 436 2.65 
Lightning 114 293 2.55 
Salt, etc. 28 129 4.57 
Non-adverse 222867 1007 0.00451 
From Table 1, it can be seen that the fault rate during non-
adverse weather is three orders of magnitude lesser than during 
adverse weather conditions.  
B. Potential impact of climate change 
From the above data, it is possible to categorise the different 
fault types by their past impact and probability. Fig. 22 
summarises the key differences between the four fault-causing 
weather types. The average number of events per cluster also 
gives a suggestion of the number of extreme weather events in 
each category. These events were not excluded from the 
average, as they have the most impact on the network.  
 
The potential future impact of fault-causing weather was also 
assessed (Fig. 23). For this it was assumed that ice, snow, sleet 
and blizzard events would become less likely, as in [5] and [8], 
lightning events would increase, as in [8], and that wind, gale, 
and windborne objects would either increase, decrease or stay 
the same as in [2] and [5] assuming that an increase in wind 
storms will see increases in wind speeds over 15m/s[9]. 
 
From this it can be seen that the average impact of any given 
weather event on the GB network is highly dependent on the 
manner in which climate change affects wind speeds. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This paper has looked at the past occurrence of various types of 
weather-related faults, in an attempt to establish patterns with a 
view to providing a broad assessment on how climate change 
may affect faults on the GB transmission network in the future. 
Different weather events were identified based on temporal 
clustering of faults IURPDURXQG\HDUV¶ZRUWKRIIDXOWUHFRUGV
for the south of Scotland. Each cluster was then assessed in 
respect of its duration, the number of faults in each cluster and 
the spread of durations of individual outages and the spatial 
extent of the cluster. 
In the case of faults due to ice, snow, sleet and blizzard, it is 
likely that the overall number of these in GB is likely to 
decrease, with an overall decrease in the number of snow days, 
and days when the temperature falls below 0 °C. The impact of 
these on the network at present can be quite dramatic, with 
occasional snow causing fault outages over a period several 
hours. Their decrease would entail reduced risk in system 
operation.  
The conditions for lightning events are likely to become more 
prevalent in the UK in the future. Although these events do not 
seem to cause large clusters of faults, they do appear more likely 
to cause a greater number of faults in a shorter time than other 
weather events. Therefore, an increase in lightning would see a 
small increase in the number of transmission faults and increase 
the likelihood of simultaneous faults, with an overall negative 
effect on the network. This would likely be offset, however, by 
the decrease in ice, sleet, snow and blizzard events which tend 
to be both more frequent and have a higher impact. 
The biggest potential impact on the network comes from any 
impact on wind speeds. If there were to be a significant increase 
in wind speeds, and extreme wind events, this would clearly 
cause a noticeable increase in transmission faults. However, it 
may also lead to more frequent occurrence of mechanical 
damage and, as a consequence, longer restoration times which 
will leave the system more exposed to N-2 or N-3 situations. If 
the system has not been re-secured in the meantime, cascades 
of outages and widespread disconnection of demand might 
result. Wind is also a factor in salt pollution on lines causing 
flashover. Conversely, if wind speeds were to remain roughly 
 
Fig. 22. Impact assessment of historic weather-type events 
 
Fig. 23. Projected impact assessment of future weather-type events 
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constant, or even to decrease then the overall impact of climate 
change on the GB network would likely be minimal, and could 
even represent a slight benefit in respect of risk associated with 
faults.  
Future work should concentrate on how wind speeds are 
likely to be affected as the climate changes. From this it should 
be possible to forecast the overall impact of climate change on 
%ULWDLQ¶V transmission grid. The system is more likely to suffer 
breaches of operational limits when faults occur not only close 
to each other in time but also in space, e.g. two or more outages 
on circuits crossing a system boundary are more likely to lead 
to disconnection demand or an overload on the remaining cross-
boundary circuits. The work reported here has considered only 
one relatively small region of GB so it has not been possible to 
make substantive comments on the spatial extent of weather 
related events in Britain as a whole. This should be addressed 
in future work. 
Other work should analyse in more detail the actual impacts 
associated with future patterns of weather. This can be done 
through sampling of weather events and of faults associated 
with each event and, in a manner similar to that described in 
[16], simulation of the power flows and stability of the system 
in each outage condition. This can then inform whether changes 
to, for example, tower design or security standards might be 
necessary to manage the impacts of changed weather. 
Finally, the kind of analysis of faults undertaken here for 
weather-related faults might also be carried out for faults not 
noted in the fault records as weather-related. For example, is it 
possible that some faults that are supposedly not weather related 
might actually be indirect consequences of weather or of prior 
events caused by adverse weather? Or, what evidence is there 
for something that is sometimes speculated on, that fault 
outages occur more often in the maintenance outage season or 
in proximity to where maintenance or construction work is 
being carried out? 
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